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Abstract
This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians
perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benets and rec-
onciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.
To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown
and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve ac-
countability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians
make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reap-
pointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot
be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underin-
vesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to
the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,
under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how
political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of im-
posing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent
with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.
They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic
uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.
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1 Introduction
Among the fundamental questions in political economy are why governments often fail to
adopt reforms that are widely believed to be welfare-improving and what conditions make
their adoption more likely. For instance, while most observers tend to agree that promoting
product market competition, providing free access to markets and reducing public debt
are often essential to preserve economic growth, the extent to which such measures are
adopted varies enormously across countries. The existing literature has identied several
explanations for an anti-reform bias, with most of them placing distributional conicts
as the cornerstone. For instance, interest groups who may lose from a reform may lobby
to block it (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 2001). Alternatively, uncertainty about the
distribution of costs and benets may lead to a status quo bias (e.g., Fernandez and Rodrik,
1991) or to a war of attrition between parties resulting in an ine¢ cient delay (Alesina and
Drazen, 1991). A popular view among policy makers, instead, is that governments are
afraid of losing votes due to the short-run costs that reforms typically entail. As Jean-
Claude Juncker, Prime Minister of Luxembourg and President of the Eurogroup, once said,
We all know what to do, but we dont know how to get reelected once we have done it.
Ever since the work of Peltzman (1992), however, economists and political scientists did
not nd evidence that reforms a¤ect adversely the chances of reelection.1 If governments
do not seem to be systematically punished at the ballot box for engaging in reforms, the
question of why they are so politically di¢ cult remains an unresolved puzzle.
In this paper, we formalize in a fully-rational model the view that politicians perceive
an electoral cost in adopting reform and we reconcile it with the evidence that their
adoption does not seem to have a negative e¤ect on reelection prospects. We do so
using a model of political accountability through elections where the key elements are
informational asymmetries and uncertainty. Similarly to the existing literature, we nd
that incumbent governments have too weak an incentive to invest in reforms. Contrary
to existing works, however, we nd that uncertainty is likely to make reforms politically
more viable. Our theory builds on the premise that the cost of reforms is immediately
observable to voters, while their actual implementation and payo¤s often are not. For
example, an increase in scal pressure is immediately evident to taxpayers, while it may
take time to see how e¤ectively tax revenues are spent. In such a situation, the incumbent
may not dare to embark in reforms, even when they are unambiguously welfare-improving,
for the fear of losing votes and hence o¢ ce. This bias against reforms holds, even when
citizens are rational and aware of political incentives, under two conditions. The rst is
1We discuss this literature more in details in the next Section.
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that ability of politicians is not directly observable to voters, so that it must be inferred
on the basis of performance. The second is an informational asymmetry between citizens
and the incumbent so that the actual investment in reforms with future returns is not
observed by voters. These assumptions generate a political cost of reforms: there is
an incentive to invest less in reforms in an e¤ort to signal high ability and thus increase
the reelection probability. Despite this, however, in a rational-expectation equilibrium
voters correctly foresee the strategy of the incumbent and also his expected ability. As
a result, politicians cannot manipulate their reelection probability. Still, their choice
to underinvest is sustained by hidden information out of equilibrium: the fact that the
politician can deviate from his equilibrium strategy in ways unknown to voters.2
Interestingly, the political costof reforms depends crucially on the sources of uncer-
tainty a¤ecting the precision of the signal that voters can see. If observable measures of
performance are poor signals of ability, for instance because the economy is going through
a period of high turbulence, the perceived probability of being reelected becomes less
sensitive to the choice of reforms thereby reducing their political cost. Thus, perhaps sur-
prisingly, the type of uncertainty highlighted in this paper promotes unambiguously the
adoption of e¢ cient reforms. Yet, the welfare e¤ects are ambiguous because uncertainty
worsens both electoral accountability, thereby inducing the incumbent to put less e¤ort,
and the ability to select good politicians. By comparing these e¤ects, we nd a simple
condition for welfare to increase or decrease with various forms of uncertainty.
The high tractability of our model allows us to use it to answer two substantive nor-
mative questions. First, we study the e¤ect of political rewards on social welfare. By
increasing the value to stay in power, higher rewards exacerbate the underinvestment in
reforms, but also induce the incumbent to exert more e¤ort. We characterize the socially
optimal level of compensation arising from this trade-o¤ and nd that politicians should
be rewarded more when e¤ort is relatively more important than reforms and uncertainty
is high. Second, since the political cost of reforms arises because incumbents care about
reelection, we ask under what conditions imposing a one-period term limit may be welfare
improving. A term limit promotes the adoption of reforms, but reduces political account-
ability and hence e¤ort, and gives up the benet of keeping well-performing politicians
in o¢ ce. We nd that imposing such a limit is welfare reducing when uncertainty is high
and e¤ort is important. Finally, we show that the main results of our model are robust
to alternative assumptions. Interestingly, when incumbents are aware of their ability and
there is complementarity between ability and the return from reforms, the model can even
2Glaeser et al. (2005) show how a similar mechanisms may explain strategic extremism in a model
where policy statements are not directly observable and parties compete for voters.
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generate a positive correlation between reforms and reelection. We also show that, when
reforms are modelled as a discrete choice, their political cost is proportional to their size.
The conict of interest between voters and politicians is an old theme in a vast lit-
erature.3 Our paper builds on agency models where the role of elections is to select the
most competent politician. This approach has been used extensively (e.g. see Nordhaus,
1975, Alesina, 1987, Rogo¤ and Sibert, 1988, Rogo¤, 1990, Persson and Tabellini, 1990,
Lohman, 1998 and Drazen, 2000a) to explain political business cycles, i.e., the incentive
for incumbents to perform well just before elections so as to appear talented to the voters.
Despite some similarities, these papers do not study the role of uncertainty and economic
shocks on political incentives to undertake reforms, while we are not interested in studying
how political incentives vary in election and non-election years.
In line with the literature on electoral accountability, initiated by Barro (1973), we con-
sider the disciplining role of elections on e¤ort choices. Yet, we argue that, when it comes
to investing in reforms, electoral incentives are more likely to induce myopic behavior.
Recent contributions by Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008) compare models of electoral
accountability and career-concerns to study how the optimal accountability mechanism
depends on the characteristics of policy tasks. The e¤ect of political compensation on
the quality of politicians has instead been studied, among others, by Caselli and Morelli
(2004), Besley (2004), Besley and Smart (2007), and Mattozzi and Merlo (2008). Once
again, none of these papers focuses on uncertainty and on the choice of reforms.
Important contributions on the political economy of reforms in the presence of un-
certainty are Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), Ciccone (2004), Cukierman et al. (1992),
Alesina and Drazen (1991). The inuential paper by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) has
shown how uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses may lead to a status
quo bias. Alesina and Drazen (1991) have instead shown that reforms may be postponed
due to a war of attrition. Drazen (2000b) discusses why reforms may be more likely in
periods of crisis. Alesina and Cukierman (1990), instead, have shown that uncertainty
allows the politicians to follow their most preferred policy, even at the expenses of voters.
Similarly to these paper, we nd that politicians have a bias against adopting reforms.
Our result, however, is based on rational myopia rather than redistributional conicts
and can explain why reforms are so politically di¢ cult even when they do not seem to
be punished by voters. Morover, the result that uncertainty lowers the political cost of
reforms is to our knowledge novel. Finally, a recent literature on institutional change has
emphasized that (adverse) economic shocks may speed up the transition towards more
democratic political regimes (see for example Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001 and 2006,
3Persson and Tabellini (2000) provide an excellent introduction to this eld.
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and the evidence in Brückner and Ciccone, 2009). Di¤erently from these papers, however,
we restrict attention to economic reforms in representative democracies only.
Finally, the general insight that uncertainty may improve the equilibrium along some
dimensions in agency models has been explored in Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999),
Holmström (1999), and Prat (2005), among others. Yet, the argument that uncertainty
may improve welfare by stimulating the adoption of reforms with future payo¤s has not
been made in the literature and appears of rst order relevance to understand the political
economy of reforms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical observa-
tions motivating our analysis. It reviews the existing evidence that reelection probability
is a¤ected by economic outcomes, but not by the adoption of reforms, and it discusses the
empirical determinants of reforms. It also unveils a new pattern in the data: in a panel of
OECD countries, periods of high economic volatility are associated to a higher propensity
to implement reforms. Section 3 builds a two-period model of elections and reforms that
can rationalize these empirical observations. It contains the main result of the paper,
that reforms entail a political cost, even if their equilibrium choice does not a¤ect the
reelection probability of the incumbent government. It also shows that, by reducing the
perceived political cost of reform, uncertainty promotes their adoption. Section 4 exam-
ines the implications of the model for social welfare. It provides conditions for uncertainty
to be welfare improving, it shows how political rewards can be set so as to maximize
the expected utility of citizens and studies the desirability of imposing a one-term limit.
Section 5 explores the robustness of the main results to alternative assumptions. Section
6 concludes.
2 Motivating Evidence
In this Section, we review the main stylized facts motivating this paper. First, there is
growing consensus that, while economic performance often a¤ects the probability that
politicians stay in power, the incidence of scal and structural reforms  despite the
economic and political costs they may entail does not. Second, reforms are more likely
to occur during times of crisis. Since the literature has not explored the link between
uncertainty and reforms, we provide some original evidence on it and nd that economic
volatility is associated to a more reformist stance on behalf of governments.
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2.1 Crisis, Reforms and Reelection
The hypothesis that reelection prospects depend on current economic performance received
early support in the works of Fair (1978, 2008), Kiewiet and Rivers (1985) and Alesina and
Rosenthal (1995). In particular, Kiewiet and Rivers (1985) nd, using data on U.S. and
Western European elections, that a 1-percent decline in real income is associated with
a reduction of the incumbent partys vote share of between 0.5 percent and 1 percent.
More recently, a series of papers have provided evidence that good economic performance
increases the likelihood that politicians stay in power. Brender and Drazen (2008) show on
a sample of 73 countries that high growth during the term in o¢ ce increases the reelection
probability, particularly in less developed countries. Using a sample of 21 OECD countries,
Buti et al. (2010) nd that high levels and growth rates of the cyclical component of GDP
have a positive impact on the chances of reelection for incumbent governments. Finally,
Wolfers (2007) provides evidence from U.S. gubernatorial elections that good economic
performance increases the likelihood that incumbent parties stay in o¢ ce.
On the contrary, many papers have failed to identify empirically the often-blamed
electoral cost of reforms. Buti et al. (2010), using data on product and labor market
reforms across OECD countries, show that reforms in general do not a¤ect the reelection
probability of incumbent governments. Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) study the
political consequences of scal adjustments in a cross section of OECD countries and nd
that scal austerity has positive rather than negative political e¤ects. Brender and Drazen
(2008) nd that loose scal policies have a negative e¤ect on the probability of reelection
in a panel of 74 countries over the period 1960-2003. Peltzman (1992), Brender (2003),
and Drazen and Eslava (2010) examine the e¤ect of scal performance on reelection at
the state and local level in a single country (the United States, Israel, and Colombia,
respectively) and nd that voters punish rather than reward loose scal policies.
2.2 Crisis, Volatility and the Likelihood of Reforms
The literature on the determinants of reforms such as marcoeconomic stabilization, trade
liberalization and deregulation, is vast. After reviewing the experiences of developing
countries with market-oriented reforms, Tommasi and Velasco (1996) conclude that the
hypothesis that crises lead to stabilization is part of the conventional wisdom. Systematic
empirical works on the determinants of reforms (see, among others, Alesina and Ardagna,
1998, Drazen and Easterly, 2001, Hamann and Prati, 2002) conrm that the adoption of
stabilization plans aimed at reducing ination, government decit and the black market
premium, is more likely in periods of crisis, i.e., when ination, decit and black market
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premium are particularly high. Recently, Alesina et al. (2006) provide evidence from
a large panel of countries that scal reforms are more likely to occur during times of
crisis, when new governments take o¢ ce and when governments are strong.Periods of
economic crisis are also found to favor the adoption of structural reforms targeted to the
markets for nancial instruments (Abiad and Mody, 2003) goods and services, and labor
(Høj et al., 2006). Although crisis and volatility are likely to be correlated, there is to
our knowledge no evidence on the relationship between reforms and economic uncertainty.
This is unfortunate because in periods of high volatility it might be easier for policy makers
to blame economic shocks instead of taking responsibility for the costs of their actions,
and this may relax their political constraints. In other words, governments may perceive
unpopular reforms to be politically more viable in times of turmoil. We now provide some
preliminary evidence on this hypothesis.
To do so, we study how economic volatility is empirically related to the likelihood
and the size of decit stabilization in a panel of 20 OECD countries observed between
1975 and 2000.4 To start with, we follow the existing literature in constructing a discrete
indicator of reform using data on the annual variation of central government decit as
a ratio of GDP (DEFICIT), from the IMF Government Finance Statistics (2001). We
dene as a reform an episode of annual fall in DEFICIT above the 80th percentile of the
empirical distribution, corresponding to reductions by more than 1.17 percentage points
in our sample. Our measure of macroeconomic volatility is the standard deviation of the
output gap, i.e., the di¤erence between the actual and the potential GDP over potential
GDP, as computed by the OECD based on estimations of the production functions. This
variable is meant to capture unexpected variations in economic performance.
Figure 1 plots the overall number of reforms observed between 1975 and 2000 in the
sample against the standard deviation of the output gap in the same period and provides
a synthetic description of the data. The line interpolating the points exhibits a positive
and signicant slope, suggesting the existence of positive correlation between volatility
and reforms.
A rst step to corroborate this graphical evidence is to test whether the cross-sectional
correlation holds after controlling for other variables. The coe¢ cients estimated with
ordinary least squares are reported in Table 1. In column 1, we simply replicate the linear
interpolation plotted in Figure 1, showing a positive and signicant correlation between
volatility over the period and the number of reforms. Next, we control for initial real
4These countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United King-
dom, United States.
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Figure 1: Economic Volatility and Decit Stabilizations.
GDP per capita and the average level of DEFICIT, in columns 2 and 3. While these
variables are not signicantly correlated with the number of reforms, the coe¢ cient for
volatility remains positive and signicant. Following the literature on crises and reforms,
we also control for the number of scal crises, dened as episodes in which government
decit as a share of GDP is above the 20th percentile (i.e., over 7.5 per cent). As columns
4 and 5 show, the number of scal crises is not signicantly correlated to the number
of reforms. Finally, we also control for the following political variables: the number of
left-wing governments (left), the number of governments in the rst two years of o¢ ce
(younggov) and a dummy for parliamentary systems. These indicators are obtained from
the 2006 release of the Database of Political Institutions compiled by the World Bank.
Consistently with previous evidence (e.g., Alesina et al., 2006), a larger number of left-wing
governments is associated to more scal adjustments, while the coe¢ cients for the other
political variables are not signicant. Throughout all specications, economic volatility
remains signicantly and positively correlated to the number of reforms.5
To better exploit the information in the dataset we now use the annual panel to
5The results are also robust to controlling for average political fractionalization and proportional (as
opposed to majoritarian) system. The estimated coe¢ cients for these variables are non signicant.
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estimate the following logit for the likelihood of reforms:
Pr[REFit = 1 j SDit 1;t 5;Xit 1] = exp (b0 + b1SDit 1;t 5 + b2Xit 1 + ui + eit)
1 + exp (b0 + b1SDit 1;t 5 + b2Xit 1 + ui + eit)
(1)
whereREFit is the dummy indicator of scal adjustment in country i and year t, SDit 1;t 5
is the standard deviation of the output gap over the ve-year period between t   1 and
t 5, Xit 1 is a vector of control variables, ui is the country xed e¤ect and eit is the error
term. All regressors are lagged one period to account for the fact that policies may be
decided the year before they are enacted, and to avoid simultaneity. Moreover, we always
include among the regressors the level of decit to control for the fact that reforms may
be more likely when the decit is particularly high.
The results are reported in Table 2. The rst specication suggests that the probability
of reforms increases with volatility, and, consistently with the empirical literature on the
determinants of reforms, it is higher the larger is the decit as a ratio of GDP in the
previous period. Since both variables are signicant, we keep them in the estimation
and add other covariates in the following regressions. First, we control for indicators of
economic activity such as the output gap and real GDP per capita, to let the likelihood of
reforms vary over the cycle. While the coe¢ cient for the output gap, in column 2, is not
signicantly di¤erent from zero, the one for real output, in column 3, is negative, pointing
to the fact that reforms are adopted more often in periods of bad economic performance.
In column 4, we replace real GDP per capita with the indicator of scal crisis (i.e., decit
level above 7.5 per cent of GDP) and nd a signicant and positive coe¢ cient, conrming
the existing evidence that a scal adjustment is more likely after a scal crisis. When
we consider both economic performance and decit crises, in column 5, all covariates
remain signicant, which points to the importance of all these variables as determinants of
reforms. Finally, column 6 shows that political factors such as the proximity of an election,
ideology and the tenure of the government do not signicantly a¤ect the likelihood of scal
stabilization. Independently of the covariates, the sign, magnitude and signicance of the
coe¢ cient for economic volatility remain unaltered.
The evidence in Tables 1 and 2 refers to a discrete indicator of reforms, whose denition
depends on a threshold value for the annual variation in the decit to GDP ratio, and
hence may be subject to discretion. To circumvent this problem and to study the intensive
margin of reforms, we now replicate the panel analysis of Table 2 using as dependent
variable the annual change in decit, DEFICIT . We therefore estimate:
DEFICITit = DEFICITit 1 + 1SDit 1;t 5 + 2Xit 1 + i + it; (2)
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where all variables and subscripts are the same as above. Since the lagged dependent
variable is included among the regressors, OLS estimates may su¤er from inconsistency.
We address this problem by implementing the Kiviet (1995) correction of the standard
errors, which requires us to re-write the estimation equation as:6
DEFICITit = eDEFICITit 1 + 1SDit 1;t 5 + 2Xit 1 + i + it;
with e =    1.7 Notice that e < 1 would imply that higher decit to GDP ratios
are followed by larger scal adjustments. Table 3 reports the estimated coe¢ cients with
robust and consistent standard errors under alternative specications of equation (2). The
estimates for lagged DEFICIT in the rst row, signicant and smaller than one, conrm
the result that countries with larger decits tend to implement stronger adjustments. The
coe¢ cients for the standard deviation of the output gap in the second row, negative and
signicant, conrm the evidence in Tables 1 and 2 that an increase in economic volatility
is followed by a stronger reduction in decits. Quantitatively, the e¤ects are substantial: a
one per cent increase in SD from its average (1.85 per cent) is followed by a 0.35 percentage
points reduction in the decit/GDP ratio. For the average country, this means a shift from
a 0.2 percentage points increase to a 0.15 percentage points fall in decit over GDP. When
controlling for the output gap, in column 2, we do not nd a signicant estimate for this
variable. The positive and signicant coe¢ cients for real GDP per capita in columns 3-5
conrm instead the result that bad economic performance tends to be followed by decit
reductions. The result that scal crises tend to be followed by decit reductions is also
conrmed by the negative and signicant coe¢ cients of columns 4 and 5.
In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that reelection is a¤ected by economic perfor-
mance, but not by the reformist stance of governments and that reforms are more likely
to occur in times of crisis and high economic volatility. In the next section, we develop a
model of the political cost of reforms that can rationalize these stylized facts.
3 A Model of Politicians, Elections and Reforms
We study an agency model of political accountability and elections with two time periods.
In the rst period, a politician of unknown ability makes decisions about e¤ort and an
unobservable investment in reforms with a payo¤ in the second period. Between peri-
ods, there is an election in which voters choose between the incumbent and a challenger.
6Since our panel is unbalanced, we implement this correction as proposed by Bruno (2005).
7Adopting the Blundell and Bond (1998) approach to dynamic panel yields similar estimates. The
relatively large time-series and reduced cross-sectional dimensions, however, cause serious problems of
over-tting, which induced us not to report these results.
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Elections serve the purpose of ousting bad performing politicians. However, this selection
ex-post also a¤ects the incentives the incumbent faces ex-ante. We use this model to study
the determinants of the choice of reforms, with a particular focus on the role of elections
and uncertainty.
3.1 Preferences and Technology
The economy is populated by a continuum of risk neutral agents which live for two periods
and discount the future at rate  2 (0; 1]. Expected utility of the representative citizen is
given by
W = E [yt + yt+1] ; (3)
where yt is a suitable measure of economic performance (e.g., income per capita) in period
t, which in turn depends on the actions of a politician. In the rst period, a citizen is
drawn at random to conduct economic policy and reforms, and for this he receives a reward
 > 0 for each period in o¢ ce. His expected utility is
U =W +    a
2
2
+ p; (4)
where a2=2 is the cost of exerting e¤ort a 2 [0; amax] and p is the perceived probability of
being reelected in the second period.8
Economic performance in the two periods, yt and yt+1, depends on the ability of the
politician in o¢ ce, t, his choice of reforms, r, and e¤ort, a, and a random shock "t:
yt = t + a  r + "t (5)
yt+1 = t+1 + f (r) + "t+1
Investing in reforms, r, has a cost in terms of current economic performance and a future
return f (r), where the return function f (r) is assumed to be increasing, concave and
three-times di¤erentiable with f 0 (0) = 1 and f 0 (1) = 0.9 The social value of e¤ort is
parametrized by  > 0. To focus on the interesting choice variables only, we disregard
e¤ort in the second period, although it would be straightforward to include. Ability of the
8This version of the citizen-candidate model provides the simplest microfoundation for a political ob-
jective function that is an average of social welfare, W , and private costs and benet. A quadratic cost
of e¤ort is chosen for tractability. Any increasing and convex cost function would yield similar results.
The upper bound on e¤ort is not crucial, but it is introduced to simplify some of the normative results in
Section 4.
9Modeling investment in r as a continuous variable allows us to study the intensive margin of reforms
and is useful for analytical tractability. In Section 5 we study the extensive margin when the choice of
reforms is discrete, i.e., when r 2 f0; Rg.
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politician in o¢ ce at time t, t, is unknown both to the citizens and to the incumbent, but
it is drawn from a known distribution   N  ; 2. The assumption that the incumbent
ignores his own ability, which is rather common in this class of models (e.g., Alesina and
Tabellini, 2007), is adopted for simplicity and it is relaxed in Section 5.10 Finally, "t is
an i.i.d. shock drawn from a known distribution "  N  0; 2" and uncorrelated to ability
(E ["] = 0).
The agency game between the citizens and the politician can be summarized as follows.
The politician chooses reforms, r, and e¤ort, a, before observing the realization of t and
"t, so as to maximize his payo¤ (4). After observing yt only, citizens decide whether to
keep the incumbent at t+1 or to replace him with a new random draw, so as to maximize
(3). There are two important asymmetries between the incumbent and the society at large.
First, the politician cares about social welfare, W , but also about his probability to stay
in o¢ ce, with a weight equal to  on the latter goal. Second, citizens only observe yt and
not the actual choice of reforms and e¤ort.
3.2 Voters
We solve the model backward. First, we nd the election rule chosen by citizens and
then we solve for the investment in reforms and e¤ort by the incumbent. Citizens face an
inference problem: they want to reelect a politician with a high , but they only observe
a noisy signal, yt = t + a  r + "t. Thus, they must form expectations on the ability of
the incumbent conditional on yt. Citizens know the distributions of  and ", and they can
foresee the equilibrium level of reforms and e¤ort that the politician will choose, re and
ae respectively (to be solved in the next section). Given this information, as in a standard
signal-extraction problem, the posterior belief on the incumbents political ability is:
bt = E [t j yt] = 2"
2 + 
2
"
 +
2
2 + 
2
"
(yt   ae + re) : (6)
That is, the posterior expectation is a weighted average of the prior, , and the observed
signal, yt   aet + re, with weights that depend on the precision of the signal: as the
variance of noise increases relative to the variance of ability, the signal becomes less and
less informative and the posterior expectation converges to the unconditional mean.
Note also that the distribution of the posterior belief on the incumbents ability is
normal: bt  N ; 4
2 + 
2
"

:
10The assumption that ability does not a¤ect the productivity of reforms is also relaxed in Section 5.
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Intuitively, bt has the same mean as , but a smaller variance.
Given (6), it is optimal to reelect the incumbent if the belief of his ability is above
average, bt  , that is if yt  y, with
y =  + ae   re: (7)
Thus, the election rule takes a simple threshold form: voters support the incumbent if
current economic performance exceeds a critical level. To nd re and ae, we now turn to
the optimization problem of the politician.
3.3 Politicians
The incumbent chooses investment in reforms, r, and e¤ort, a, so as to maximize his
expected utility (4), given the voting strategy of citizens and his information set. Hence,
given that E [t] =  and E ["] = 0, his problem is:
max
fr;ag

   r + a  a
2
2
+  +  [Et+1 + f (r) + p]

(8)
subject to:
p = Pr (yt  y) = Pr ( + a  r + "t  y)
= 1 G (y + r   a) ; (9)
where G () is the c.d.f. of the realization ( + "t), which is normally distributed with
mean  and variance 2" + 
2
, and density g ().
Note that p is a decreasing function of reforms and an increasing function of e¤ort:
@p
@r
=  g (y + r   a) < 0 (10)
@p
@a
= g (y + r   a) > 0: (11)
That is, a marginal increase in r lowers the observed realization of yt and thus the prob-
ability to meet the threshold for reelection. Similarly, a marginal increase in a raises
the observed realization of yt and thus the perceived probability of being reelected. Note
also that, by distorting the signal, reforms and e¤ort may also a¤ect Et+1. However,
it turns out that in the rational expectation equilibrium the election rule maximizes
Et+1 given the choice of r and a. Therefore, an envelope argument guarantees that
@Et+1=@r = @Et+1=@a = 0. For this reason and to simplify the notation, we will use
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this equilibrium result to disregard the terms @Et+1=@r and @Et+1=@a in the rst-order
conditions.
The choice of r must satisfy the following equation:
f 0 (r) = 1  @p
@r
: (12)
The LHS of (12) represents the marginal benet of reforms, equal to the discounted mar-
ginal product of r. The RHS is the marginal cost, which has two components. The rst
one is the social cost of r due to foregone output today. The second component, instead,
is what we call the political cost of reforms: by investing more in reforms the policy
maker lowers current output and hence his probability to be reelected. This cost to the
politician is proportional to the (discounted) value of staying in o¢ ce, .
The rst-order condition for e¤ort is instead:11
a = +
@p
@a
: (13)
That is, the marginal cost of e¤ort is equalized to the marginal social value, , plus the
marginal private benet due to a higher probability of being reelected. The latter term
captures the discipliningrole of elections.
3.4 Equilibrium Reforms, Effort and Political Selection
In the rational expectation equilibrium, citizens correctly predict reforms and e¤ort so
that we can impose r = re and a = ae. Thus, (10) and (11) become:
 @p
@r
=
1

@p
@a
= g
 

  g = [2(2 + 2")] 1=2; (14)
because G  N  ; 2 + 2". Reforms and e¤ort satisfy:
f 0 (r) = 1 + g; (15)
and
a =  (1 + g) : (16)
What are the equilibrium determinants of reforms and e¤ort? The next Proposition
answers this question by showing the comparative statics of the choice of r and a to
changes in the main parameters of interest for the politician: the degree of uncertainty,
11Throughout this Section, we assume that the constraint a < amax is never binding in equilibrium and
we therefore disregard it in the rst-order conditions.
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coming from the random ability draw () and the noise shock ("), and the value of staying
in o¢ ce ().12
Proposition 1 The equilibrium level of reforms is increasing in the variance of both noise
(2") and ability (
2
), and it is decreasing in the level of political compensation ():
@r
@2"
> 0;
@r
@2
> 0;
@r
@
< 0:
The equilibrium level of e¤ort is decreasing in the variance of both noise (2") and ability
(2), and it is increasing in the level of political compensation ():
@a
@2"
< 0;
@a
@2
< 0;
@a
@
> 0:
Proof. See Appendix
The rst notable result is that uncertainty promotes reforms by lowering their political
cost, g. To see why, recall that incumbents are reluctant to embark in reforms with future
payo¤s because they are afraid that their economic cost may be interpreted by voters as a
sign of low ability. However, when ability and shocks are highly dispersed, the reelection
probability depends more on the realization of  and ", rather than on the choice of r.
Formally, from (14), g decreases as 2" and 
2
 rise:
@g
@2"
=
@g
@2
=   g
2(2 + 
2
")
: (17)
It follows that there is a lower incentive to inate current performance at the expenses
of reforms when
 
2" + 
2


is high. On the contrary, for a given g, a high value of being
in o¢ ce, , means that the incumbent cares more about reelection and this increases the
political cost of reforms. Note also that there is an interesting interaction between these
e¤ects in that the impact of uncertainty is strong when the reward at stake is high and
the impact of  is strong when uncertainty is low.
The e¤ect of uncertainty on e¤ort is precisely the opposite. By the same reasoning
as above, when uncertainty is high the marginal e¤ect of an extra unit of e¤ort on the
probability of being reelected is small. For a given g, instead, a high value of being in
o¢ ce, , increases the perceived value of e¤ort. Thus, more uncertainty (2 and 
2
") and
a lower stake () reduce the disciplining e¤ect of elections and the equilibrium e¤ort.
12Note that the variance of ability and of the noise shock determine the volatility of economic perfor-
mance, V ar (yt) = 2" + 
2
:
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Imposing r = re and a = ae into (7) and then using (9), the reelection probability
turns out to be
p = Pr
 
t + "t  

=
1
2
;
which is just the unconditional probability that the incumbent be more able than the
population average. Thus, in equilibrium the choice of reform does not a¤ect the probability
of reelection. Yet, what drives the political cost of reforms (i.e., @p=@r < 0 in 12) is
hidden information out of equilibrium: the fact that politicians can deviate from their
equilibrium strategy in ways unknown to voters. Note also that the political cost of
reforms would disappear if there were no uncertainty about .
Finally, we can solve for Et+1, i.e., the ex-ante expected ability of the politician in
o¢ ce in the second period, given the equilibrium behavior of voters and the incumbent.
With probability (1  p), the politician will be a new draw with expected ability . With
probability p, it will instead be an incumbent who, by virtue of the voting strategy, is
expected to be better than the average. Hence:
Et+1 = (1  p)  + pE

t+1 j bt   (18)
=  +

2
;
where  represents the selection e¤ect, that is, the di¤erence between the ex-ante ex-
pected ability of a reelected incumbent and the average. This is equal to the average of the
posterior belief truncated from below at , minus the unconditional mean. Using standard
properties of normal distributions yields:
 =
22q 
2 + 
2
"

2
= 22g: (19)
Note that reelected politicians tend to be better than the average and more so when ability
is highly dispersed (there is no benet from selection if politicians are all alike) and when
noise is low (so that it is less likely to reelect bad but lucky politicians).
4 Welfare Analysis
We now explore the implications of the model for social welfare. To start with, we com-
pare the equilibrium derived above with a constrained e¢ cient benchmark and show that
politicians choose a suboptimally low level of reforms. Then, we examine the impact of
uncertainty on welfare and derive conditions for the e¤ect to be positive. We also study
how the political reward a¤ects welfare and show how it can be set so as to maximize the
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expected utility of citizens. Finally, we use the model to examine the role of elections and
whether or not it is socially desirable to impose a one-term limit to the politician in o¢ ce.
Using (3), (5) and (18), expected ex-ante social welfare is:
W =    r + a+ 

 +

2
+ f (r)

: (20)
where r and a solve (15) and (16), respectively. The above equilibrium is ine¢ cient. A
benevolent social planner subject to the same information set would choose reforms rFB
so as to equate the social benet to the social cost:
f 0
 
rFB

= 1: (21)
Comparing (21) to (15), it is immediate to see that the level of reforms chosen by the
politician is too low. This ine¢ ciency arises from the political cost that reforms impose
on the incumbent: the fact that, by deviating from the equilibrium strategy, he can
increase his chance to be reelected.13 In sum (proof in the text):
Proposition 2 In the above environment, investment in reforms, r, is below the level
that would maximize social welfare.
Note also that, since W is increasing in a, a social planner would set e¤ort to its
maximum, amax.
4.1 Uncertainty and Welfare
In the next proposition, we characterize how uncertainty a¤ects ex-ante expected social
welfare (20).
Proposition 3 The e¤ect on social welfare of the variance of noise (2") and of ability
(2) is ambiguous:
@W
@2"
> 0()   g
2
f 00 (r)
> 2 + 
2 (22)
@W
@2
> 0() 2 + 22"  
2g
f 00 (r)
> 2 (23)
Proof. See Appendix
13The same distortion leading to suboptimal reforms would arise even in the absence of elections if future
political compensation was increasing in current economic performance, as empirically show by Di Tella
and Fisman (2004) using data on US gubernatorial salaries.
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Figure 2: Welfare and Uncertainty (2")
The variance of noise (2") has contrasting e¤ects on welfare. First, Proposition 1 shows
that noise promotes investment in reforms. Given that reforms are always suboptimally
low, this e¤ect tends to increase social welfare. Second, Proposition 1 also shows that noise
reduces e¤ort and this tends to lower social welfare. Third, by making luck relatively more
important, a higher noise raises the probability to oust a talented incumbent or to conrm
a bad one. Thus, 2" reduces the selection premium, ; and hence social welfare. The
rst e¤ect dominates the other two, so that noise turns out to be welfare improving, when
reforms are relatively more important than e¤ort and selection. This is more likely to be
the case when the political cost of reforms, g, is high (so that underinvestment is severe),
e¤ort is not very valuable (low ) and ability is very concentrated (low 2). Given that
g ! 0 when 2" ! 1, condition (22) cannot be satised when 2" is high enough. Thus,
the negative welfare e¤ect must dominate if noise is su¢ ciently high.
Without additional restrictions, welfare can be a highly non-monotonic function of 2".
Some examples are reported in Figure 2 for the case f (r) = r and a small . The dashed
line represents the asymptotic level of welfare as 2" !1, i.e., when reforms are optimal
but there is no benet from selection. The upper curve displays the relationship betweenW
and 2" for a high value of 
2
. When ability is very dispersed, selection is so important that
an increase in noise is always welfare-reducing, despite its positive e¤ect on reforms. The
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lower curve corresponds to the opposite scenario in which heterogeneity in ability is very
low, so that selection is not very useful. In this case, welfare increases with uncertainty
until 2" becomes very large (the point at which the curve becomes downward sloping is
not shown). Two intermediate examples make the non-monotonicity more evident.
The variance of ability (2) has contrasting welfare e¤ects too. On the one hand, more
dispersion in political ability increases reforms (Proposition 1) and the selection premium,
 (as can be seen from 19). These e¤ects tend to increase social welfare. On the other
hand, Proposition 1 shows that more heterogeneity reduces e¤ort. The positive welfare
e¤ect will dominate when reforms and selection are relatively more important than e¤ort.
That is, when g is high (so that underinvestment is severe), e¤ort is not very valuable
(low ) and ability is dispersed (high 2). From (23), it is immediate to see that the
positive welfare e¤ect of heterogeneity must dominate if 2 is su¢ ciently high.
4.2 Optimal Political Reward
What are the welfare e¤ects of political rewards, ? If rents from o¢ ce increase, the
politician will care more about reelection and this will induce him to exert more e¤ort,
but also to invest less in reforms (see Proposition 1).14 The resulting trade-o¤ suggests
that there might exist a socially optimal level of political rewards. This possibility is
worth exploring because, although  includes psychological rents and private benets that
may be di¢ cult to control, the pay to politicians in power can partly be chosen by the
society and varies considerably across countries.15 Thus, we now turn to the analysis of
the optimum  and its determinant.
Di¤erentiating expected social welfare, (20), w.r.t.  yields:
@W
@
= 
@a
@
+

f 0 (r)  1 @r
@
The rst term is the marginal value of political rewards, MB (): one additional unit of
 increases e¤ort by @a=@, with a value proportional to . The second term is instead
the marginal cost, MC (): an extra unit of  biases reforms downward (@r=@ < 0)
and the cost of this is proportional to the severity of underinvestment in equilibrium,
[f 0 (r)  1] > 0. Using (15) and (16) and simplifying terms, the rst-order condition for
14Some evidence that the wage paid to politicians a¤ects their performance is provided, by Besley (2004)
for the U.S., Ferraz and Finan (2009) for Brazil, and Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2009) for Italy.
15For example, Besley (2004) reports that the US president is paid around $400,000, the British prime
minister $270,000, while the French president $70,000. See Diermeier et al. (2005) for a pioneering attempt
at quantifying and decomposing the returns to a career in the US Congress.
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an interior optimum is:
MB () = 2 =  @r
@
 =MC () : (24)
To characterize the solution to (24), in Figure 3 we plot both MB and MC as a function
of . The MB curve is represented by the dashed, at, line.16 The MC curve (solid line)
starts at zero and may be non monotonic (the Figure shows two possible cases). Its slope
is analyzed formally in Lemma 1:
Lemma 1 The marginal cost of  is increasing if and only if
f 00 (r)2 > f 000 (r) g:
Proof. See Appendix
The condition in Lemma 1 is always satised when  ! 0 and also if f 000 (r) < 0.
Yet, when f 000 (r) > 0 (e.g., for f = r with 0 <  < 1), MC may be hump-shaped. In
what follows, we restrict attention to the most interesting case in which MB and MC
intersect once and only once over the relevant range  2 [0; (amax=  1) =g].17 Under
this restriction, the solution, , to (24) is unique and interior, and theMC curve must be
positively sloped at . We study the comparative statics of  to changes in parameters
in the following proposition.18
Proposition 4 The socially optimal political reward,
 =
 2f 00 (r)
g
;
is increasing in the variance of both noise (2") and ability (
2
), and in the value of e¤ort
():
@
@2"
> 0;
@
@2
> 0;
@
@
> 0:
Proof. See Appendix
An increase in uncertainty (due to either ability dispersion or noise) a¤ects the mar-
ginal cost of political compensation while leaving its marginal benet una¤ected. Higher
16The MB curve is at because e¤ort is linear in , which in turn depends on the assumption of a
quadratic cost of a. Our results generalize to su¢ ciently convex cost functions.
17Recall that there exists an upper bound to e¤ort, amax. Therefore, it is never optimal to o¤er a
compensation higher than the minimum level inducing the maximum e¤ort.
18Thus, the upper bound on a rules out the rather extreme and not very realistic case in which social
welfare is maximized for  !1 and a!1.
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Figure 3: Opimal : Solid = MC, Dashed = MB
uncertainty means that chance plays a bigger role in reelection, implying that r becomes
less reactive to . From (24) we see that this reduces the marginal cost of . As a
result, optimal political compensation increases. A higher value of e¤ort, , raises the
marginal benet of  while leaving the marginal cost una¤ected. Therefore, the optimal
compensation increases with the value of e¤ort.
4.3 Term Limit
A key reason why reforms are too low is that incumbents care not only about social
welfare, but also their reelection. Thus, a way to align the incentives of politicians to
do reforms and those of the society would be to rule out the possibility of reelection by
imposing a one-period term limit. This would set both p and @p=@r to zero and restore the
rst-best investment in reforms. Yet, without electoral incentives, incumbents will put less
e¤ort. Moreover, by excluding reelection, citizens forego the opportunity of retaining well
performing candidates.19 Therefore, despite its negative e¤ect on reforms, the prospect
of reelection may be in the interest of the society, although a one-term limit might be
19See Besley and Case (1995) for evidence that term limits do apper to a¤ect policy choices. Yet, from
their results it is di¢ cult to sort out the e¤ects on e¤ort and on reforms.
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optimal under some conditions. We now explore this possibility formally.
The equilibrium under a one-term limit is characterized by r = rFB, a =  and  = 0.
Ruling out reelection is socially optimal if it grants an ex-ante expected social welfare,
W TL, higher than W , i.e., when:
W TL  W = f  rFB  rFB   (f (r)  r)  
2
+ 2g

> 0:
The rst term in square brackets, which is always positive, is the gain from a term limit
due to the higher investment in reforms. The second term, instead, is the loss in social
welfare for giving up selection and lowering e¤ort. Rearranging and using (19) yields that
a one-term limit is socially optimal if and only if:

f
 
rFB
  rFB   (f (r)  r) > g  2 + 2 (25)
This condition is more likely to hold when selection is not very useful or e¤ective, ability
has low value, and reforms are highly needed. More precisely, an increase in  raises the
RHS of (25) thereby making the optimality of a term-limit less likely.
The e¤ect of uncertainty is instead more complex. First, note that 2 and 
2
" do
not a¤ect W TL, but have ambiguous e¤ects on W , as discussed in Proposition 3. More
uncertainty lowers the LHS of (25), because it reduces the underinvestment in reforms
(recall, r converges monotonically to rFB as either 2 ! 1 or 2" ! 1). This tends
to make a term limit less attractive. Yet, the e¤ect on the RHS of (25) may depend on
the source of uncertainty. When there is more political heterogeneity (higher 2) there is
more to gain from ex-post selection, but there is also less e¤ort in an equilibrium with
reelections. The rst e¤ect dominates, so that the RHS of (25) increases if:
@

g
 
2 + 
2

@2
> 0() 2 + 22" > 2
Thus, if 2 is su¢ ciently high, a term limit is never optimal.
An increase in 2", instead, worsens selection and lowers the RHS of (25). Since it also
lowers the LHS, it is unclear whether or not it makes a term-limit more attractive. Despite
this ambiguity, it can be shown that, if 2" is high enough, imposing the term limit cannot
be optimal. The reason is that, as 2" !1, W converges to W TL and @W=@2" < 0 (the
latter follows from Proposition 3), implying that W must converge from above. Thus, we
must have W > W TL when the noise is su¢ ciently high. We summarize this discussion
in the following Proposition (proof in the text):
Proposition 5 There exists a threshold level of heterogeneity in political ability, b2, such
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Figure 4: Uncertainty and Term Limit
that for 2 > b2 holding elections without the term limit is socially optimal. There exists
a threshold level of economic volatility, b2", such that for 2" > b2" holding elections without
the term limit is socially optimal.
More generally, the desirability of a term limit is depicted in Figure 4 in the space
(2"; 
2
). In the region below the solid line, welfare is higher when a term limit is in place.
Clearly, if 2 is high enough so that selection is su¢ ciently important, a term limit is
never optimal. Similarly, if 2" is high enough, imposing the term limit cannot be optimal
either. Moreover, as the gure shows, depending on parameters, a term limit may be
more likely to be optimal for intermediate values of noise. For example, this is the case
when the degree of heterogeneity in political ability corresponds to the dashed line. This
happens because, for low 2" selection is very e¤ective and e¤ort is high, this compensating
the underinvestment in reforms.
5 Robustness
We now study the robustness of the main results derived in Section 3 to alternative
assumptions. In particular, we show that when politicians are aware of their own ability,
their equilibrium choices (r and a) will depend on talent, . Yet, the political cost of
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reform is still present in this version of the model and is still decreasing in the degree of
uncertainty they face. Moreover, when good politicians are also relatively better at doing
reforms, the model can generate a positive correlation between reforms and reelection,
as found in some of the empirical literature (e.g., Alesina et al. 1998 and Brender and
Drazen, 2008). Last, we study the extensive margin of reforms in a version of the model
where the choice of r is discrete and nd the new result that the political cost is increasing
in the size of reforms.
5.1 Political Ability and Reforms
If the incumbent knows his ability i before choosing reforms, the voting strategy does
not change since citizens can only condition their choice on yt and they cannot disentangle
i from "t. This means that they stick to the rule of reelecting any incumbent delivering
an outcome above the expected mean, yt  y =  + ae   re, where re and ae are the
equilibrium level of reforms and e¤ort chosen by the average politician (with i = ). The
problem facing incumbent i is now di¤erent:
max
fr;ag

i   ri + ai   a
2
i
2
+  + 

pi (i + ) + (1  pi)  + f (ri)

(26)
subject to:
pi = Pr (yt  y) = Pr (i + ai   ri + "t  y)
= 1 H (y   i + ri   ai) ; (27)
whereH is the c.d.f. of "  N  0; 2", with density h. The perceived reelection probability,
pi, is still decreasing in reforms and increasing in e¤ort:
@pi
@ri
=  h (y   i + ri   ai) < 0; (28)
@pi
@ai
= h (y   i + ri   ai) > 0: (29)
The rst-order conditions to the incumbents problem are:
f 0 (ri) = 1  @pi
@ri
 
i    + 

; (30)
ai = + 
@pi
@ai
 
i    + 

: (31)
The main di¤erence with respect to equations (12) and (13) is that investment in reforms
and e¤ort now varies with ability. In particular, compared to (21), incumbents with
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very low ability (i <    ) overinvest in reforms to voluntarily reduce their reelection
probability, because the cost of having a bad politician outweighs their private benet from
remaining in o¢ ce. All the other politicians (with i >    ) adopt too little reforms,
as in the previous section. Similarly, good politicians put more e¤ort to increase their
reelection probability pi, because the value of staying in power is proportional to i.
Although pi, ri and ai are now ability specic, it is useful to characterize the equilibrium
for the average politician (with i = ), because it coincides with the ex-ante expected
equilibrium. Imposing i =  and rational expectations (ri = r = re and ai = a = ae) into
(28)-(31), the rst-order conditions of the average-ability incumbent become:
f 0 (r) = 1 + h
a = 
 
1 + h

with h =

22"
 1=2. Comparing these conditions to (15) and (16), we see that the average
politician now makes less reforms and puts more e¤ort than in Section 3. This is because
the incumbent faces a lower degree of political uncertainty (he knows his own type, i)
and, as already discussed, lower uncertainty implies less reforms and more e¤ort. For the
same reason, r and a do not depend on 2 anymore, since the only source of uncertainty
for the incumbent is now the noise shock, ". Yet, a higher volatility of " increases (reduces)
the average level of reforms (e¤ort), precisely as in Proposition 1.
It is also interesting to note that, for politicians of very high or very low ability,
uncertainty may now increase the political cost of reforms. Formally, from (28),  @pi=@ri
becomes a positive function of 2" for su¢ ciently high or low i, because the density h()
in the tails gets fatter when the variance increases. Thus, uncertainty lowers investment
in reforms of very good or very bad politicians, but politicians in the tails are a minority
only. In sum, while the e¤ects are now more nuanced, uncertainty still unambiguously
reduces the average political cost of reforms.
The result that good politicians make less reform may appear unappealing. Yet, this
result can be overturned by assuming not only that politicians know their own type, but
also that political ability matters for reforms. In particular, assume that f (ri; i), with
the f () function being supermodular (i.e., @2f(ri;i)@ri@i > 0). In words, good politicians are
also relatively better at doing reforms. Then, the new rst-order condition for ri becomes:

@f (ri; i)
@ri
= 1  @pi
@ri
 
i    + 

Provided that @
2f(ri;i)
@ri@i
is su¢ ciently high, better politician will now make more reforms.
Moreover, since better politicians have a higher chance of being reelected, this version of
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the model can generate a positive correlation between reforms and reelection. In this way,
the model can reconcile the reluctance of adopting reforms for fear of losing elections with
some of the evidence reported in Section 2 that reforms seems to be rewarded (rather than
punished) by voters.
5.2 Discrete Choice of Reforms
So far, we have modelled investment in reforms as a continuous variable. While this
approach is useful to study the intensity of reforms and may be appropriate, for instance,
for some budget policies, often times reforms particularly the bigger ones come rarely
and discontinuously. We now consider this possibility by assuming that the incumbent
faces the binary choice of whether or not to implement a reform of a given size R > 0.
Formally, r 2 f0; Rg. It turns out that this case is somewhat simpler when politicians are
aware of their ability.20 We therefore maintain the assumption, introduced in the previous
Section, that i is known to the incumbent.
We also assume that the value of reforms, f (r), is stochastic and is drawn from any non-
degenerate distribution. This modeling strategy is standard in models where investment
in some public good may uctuate, as for example in Battaglini and Coate (2008), and
will yield the result that reforms are implemented (r = R) only if the realized f (R)
is high enough. Consistently with the informational assumptions maintained so far, we
consider the case in which the realization of f (r) is equally known both to voters and the
government. Thus, there are periods in which reforms, such as reducing decits in order
to avoid EU sanctions, are highly needed and this is public information. In this setting,
a social planner would implement a reform of size R if its social value is greater than its
cost:
f (R) > R: (32)
The problem of the incumbent is to choose r 2 f0; Rg so as to maximize (26) subject
to (27). The politician will choose r = R if this yields a higher utility than r = 0. This is
the case if the following condition is satised:
f (R) > R+  (p0   pR)

i    + 

;
where p0 and pR are the perceived probability of being reelected conditional on choosing
r = 0 and r = R, respectively. That is, the reform is implemented if its social value (the
20The reason is that, with a discrete choice of r, we cannot apply anymore the envelope argument that
allows us to disregard from the rst-order conditions the e¤ect of reforms on the expected ability of the
politician in o¢ ce in the second period.
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LHS) is greater than its social cost (the rst term on the RHS) plus its political cost (the
second term on the RHS).
As before, the expected equilibrium outcome is equal to the choice of the average
politician. Thus, imposing i = , we have that r = R as long as:
f (R)  R+  (p0   pR) ; (33)
where, from (27) and rational expectation, p0 = 1 H ( R) and pR = 1 H (0). Recalling
that H is the c.d.f. of "  N  0; 2" and using the properties of normal distributions, we
have:
p0   pR = 1
2
 H ( R) = 

R
"

  1
2
 0 (34)
where  () is the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution, N (0; 1). Equations (33) and
(34) conrm the existence of a political cost of reforms which is decreasing in the level
of uncertainty, ". Moreover, this version of the model yields the new result that the
political cost of reforms is higher when reforms are large (high R). Finally, even in this
case, voters have rational expectations on whether the reform will be implemented or not
and therefore the equilibrium choice over r has no bearings on the reelection probability.
Yet, compared to (32), too few reforms are undertaken because of their out-of-equilibrium
political cost.
6 Conclusions
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, we have formalized
in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in
adopting costly reforms with future benets, even when in equilibrium there is no ev-
idence that reformist government are punished by voters. Second, we have shown how
uncertainty is likely to make reforms politically more viable. Third, while uncertainty
promotes the adoption of welfare-enhancing reforms, it may also worsen political selection
and accountability. As a result, its net welfare e¤ect may be ambiguous. Fourth, we
have used the model to study the optimal level of political compensation. Our theory
suggests that the optimal reward should trade o¤ the benet of higher e¤ort with the cost
of more underinvestment in reforms. It follows that politicians should be rewarded more
when e¤ort is relatively more important than reforms and uncertainty is high. Fifth, we
have shown that imposing a term limit promotes reforms, but it is welfare reducing when
political ability is su¢ ciently heterogenous and uncertainty high.
We conclude by mentioning some limitations of our model and suggestions for future
work. Although our results have been derived in a two-period model, we expect them
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to hold at least qualitatively in an innite horizon setup. A simple way to show this
would be by assuming that the agency game between voters and politicians is repeated
and that incumbents have a two-term limit. In this case, since politicians at the second
mandate would do more reforms, but put less e¤ort, than a new challenger, the model
could explain the so called incumbency advantage (e.g., see Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995).
That is, provided that reforms are more important than e¤ort, the equilibrium probability
of being reelected would be higher than one half. Alternatively, one could consider a richer
time structure and assume that ability follows a rst-order moving average process, as in
Rogo¤ (1990).
Another limitation of our approach is that it takes uncertainty as exogenous. In many
instances, for example when uncertainty arises from global economic shocks or from a lack
of transparency rooted in institutions or cultural traits, this is a reasonable approximation.
Yet, some political reforms may be aimed precisely at lowering uncertainty, either by means
of economic stabilization or through improved monitoring and accountability procedures.
Allowing policy makers to a¤ect the degree of uncertainty they are exposed to would add
feedback e¤ects and seems an interesting direction for future research.
The model could also be extended to include other aspects of reforms, such as their
redistributional implications, that are often considered as important. While our goal
was to provide an explanation for the political resistance to reform that complements
those based on conicting interests, combining these approaches will certainly produce
interesting results. For instance, if politicians could target certain groups to bear the cost
of reform, then the model might imply timid reforms whose costs are e¢ ciently shared
when uncertainty is low and bold reforms that are disproportionately costly for political
losers when uncertainty is high. This would be consistent with the nding that reforms
tend to generate winners and losers for political reasons rather than economic necessity
(see, for example, Alesina and Drazen, 1991 and Alesina et al. 2006).
Finally, although we have discussed some notable empirical support for our theory,
including new evidence on the correlation between economic uncertainty and scal policy
reforms, a formal test of the models predictions goes beyond the scope of this paper. For
example, an implication that could easily be taken to the data is that technical govern-
ments or governments close to a term limit are more inclined to reform. More generally,
we hope that our paper will stimulate new empirical investigations of the underexplored
links between instability, elections and the adoption of reforms.
28
References
[1] Abiad, Abdul and Ashoka Mody (2005). Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What
Shapes It?,American Economic Review 95(1), 66-88.
[2] Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (2001). A Theory of Political Transitions,
American Economic Review 91(4), 938-963.
[3] Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship
and Democracy,New York, Cambridge University Press.
[4] Alesina, Alberto (1987). Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Re-
peated Game,Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, 651 678.
[5] Alesina, Alberto and Silvia Ardagna (1998). Tales of Fiscal Adjustment,Economic
Policy 27, 489-545.
[6] Alesina, Alberto, Silvia Ardagna and Francesco Trebbi (2006). Who Adjusts and
When? On the Political Economy of Reforms,IMF Sta¤Papers 53, Mundell-Fleming
Lecture, 1-29.
[7] Alesina, Alberto and Alex Cukierman (1990). The Politics of Ambiguity,Quarterly
Journal of Economics 105(4), 829-250.
[8] Alesina, Alberto and Allan Drazen (1991). Why are Stabilizations Delayed?,Amer-
ican Economic Review 81, 1170-1188.
[9] Alesina, Alberto, Roberto Perotti and Jose Tavares (1998). The Political Economy
of Fiscal Adjustments,Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 197-266.
[10] Alesina, Alberto and Howard Rosenthal (1995). Partisan Politics, Divided Govern-
ment and the Economy, Cambridge University Press.
[11] Alesina, Alberto and Guido Tabellini (2007). Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A
Single Policy Task,American Economic Review 97(1), 169-79.
[12] Alesina, Alberto and Guido Tabellini (2008). Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II:
Multiple Policy Tasks,Journal of Public Economics 92, 426-447.
[13] Barro, Robert (1973). The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public
Choice 14, 19-42.
[14] Battaglini, Marco and Stephen Coate (2008). A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending,
Taxation, and Debt,American Economic Review, 98:1, 201236.
29
[15] Besley, Timothy (2004). Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence, Joseph Schum-
peter Lecture, Journal of the European Economics Association 2 (2-3), 193-215.
[16] Besley, Timothy and Anne Case (1995). Does Electoral Accountability A¤ect Eco-
nomic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits,Quarterly Journal
of Economics 110 (3), 769-798.
[17] Besley, Timothy and Michael Smart (2007). Fiscal Restraints and Voter Welfare,
Journal of Public Economics 91, 755773.
[18] Blundell, Richard and Stephen Bond (1998). Initial Conditions and Moment Re-
strictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models,Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115-143.
[19] Brender, Adi (2003). The E¤ect of Fiscal Performance on Local Government Election
Results in Israel: 19891998,Journal of Public Economics, 87(910): 21872205.
[20] Brender, Adi and Allan Drazen (2008). How Do Budget Decits and Economic
Growth A¤ect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries,
American Economic Review 98(5), 2203-2220.
[21] Bruno, Giovanni S. F. (2005). Estimation and Inference in Dynamic Unbalanced
Panel-Data Models With a Small Number of Individuals,The Stata Journal 5(4),
473-500.
[22] Brückner, Markus and Antonio Ciccone (2009). Rainfall and the Democratic Win-
dow of Opportunity,Universitat Pompeu Fabra, mimeo.
[23] Buti, Marco, Alessandro Turrini, Paul Van den Noord, and Pietro Biroli (2010).
Reforms and re-elections in OECD countries,Economic Policy 61, 61-116.
[24] Caselli, Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004). Bad Politicians,Journal of Public
Economics 88, 759782.
[25] Ciccone, Antonio (2004). Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence
of Individual-Specic Uncertainty: Comment, American Economic Review 94(3),
785-795.
[26] Cukierman, Alex, Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1992). Seigniorage and
Political Instability,American Economic Review 82(3), 537-555.
[27] Dewatripont, Mathias, Ian Jewitt and Jean Tirole (1999). The Economics of Ca-
reer Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government
Agencies,Review of Economic Studies 66(1), 199-217.
30
[28] Diermeier, Daniel, Michael Keane and Antonio Merlo (2005). A Political Economy
Model of Congressional Careers,American Economic Review 95, 347373.
[29] Di Tella, Rafael, and Raymond Fisman (2004). Are Politicians Really Paid Like
Bureaucrats?,Journal of Law and Economics 47(2), 477-514.
[30] Drazen, Allan (2000a). The Political Business Cycle After 25 Years,NBER Macro-
economics Annuals, Bernanke, Ben and Kenneth Rogo¤ (Eds.), MIT Press, Cam-
bridge MA.
[31] Drazen, Allan (2000b). Political Economy in Macroeconomics, Princeton University
Press, Princeton.
[32] Drazen, Allan and William Easterly (2001). Do Crises Induce Reform?: Simple
Empirical Tests of Conventional Wisdom, Economics and Politics 13, 129-157.
[33] Drazen, Allan, and Marcela Eslava (2010). Electoral Manipulation via Voter-
Friendly Spending: Theory and Evidence,Journal of Development Economics, vol.
92, 3952.
[34] Fair, Ray C., (1978). The E¤ect of Economic Events on Votes for President,Review
of Economics and Statistics, 60, 159-173.
[35] Fair, Ray C. (2008). Presidential and Congressional Vote-Share Equations,Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science 53 (1), 55 - 72.
[36] Fernandez, Raquel and Dani Rodrik (1991). Resistance to Reform: Status Quo
Bias in the Presence of Individual- Specic Uncertainty,American Economic Review
81(5), 1146-1155.
[37] Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan (2009). Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of
Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance,NBER working paper 14906.
[38] Gagliarducci, Stefano and Tommaso Nannicini (2009). Do Better Paid Politicians
Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection, IZA Discussion Paper
4400.
[39] Glaeser, Edward L., Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, and Jesse M. Shapiro (2005). Strategic
Extremism: Why Republicans and Democrats Divide on Religious Values, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 120, 12831330.
[40] Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001). Special Interest Politics,MIT Press,
Cambridge MA and London UK
31
[41] Hamann, A. Javier and Alessandro Prati (2002). Why Do many Stabilizations fail?
The importance of Luck, Timing and Political Institution, IMF Working Paper n.
02/228.
[42] Holmström, Bengt (1999). Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective,
Review of Economic Studies 66(1), 169-182
[43] Høj, Jens, Thai Tanh Dang, Vincenzo Galasso and Giuseppe Nicoletti (2006). The
Political Economy of Structural Reform: Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries,
OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 501.
[44] Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Rivers, Douglas (1985). A Retrospective on Retrospective
Voting,in Heinz Eulau and Michael S. Lewis- Beck, eds., Economic Conditions and
Electoral Outcomes: The United States and Western Europe, New York: Agathon,
1985, pp. 207-31.
[45] Kiviet, Jan F. (1995). On Bias, Inconsistency and E¢ ciency of Various Estimators
in Dynamic Panel Data Models,Journal of Econometrics 68, 53-78.
[46] Lohmann, Susanne (1998). Rationalizing the Political Business Cycle: a Workhorse
Model,Economics and Politics 10(1), 1-17.
[47] Mattozzi, Andrea and Antonio Merlo (2008). Political Careers or Career Politi-
cians?,Journal of Public Economics 92, 597-608.
[48] Nordhaus, William (1975). The political business cycle,Review of Economic Studies
42, 169190.
[49] Peltzman, Sam (1992). Voters as Fiscal Conservatives,Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 107(2): 32761.
[50] Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1990). Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and
Politics, Harwood Academic Publishers, London.
[51] Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Eco-
nomics Policy,MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
[52] Prat, Andrea (2005). The Wrong Kind of Transparency,American Economic Re-
view 95(3), 862-877.
[53] Rogo¤, Kenneth (1990). Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,American Economic
Review 80, 2136.
32
[54] Rogo¤, Kenneth and Anne Sibert (1988). Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cy-
cles,Review of Economic Studies 55(1), 1-16.
[55] Tommasi, Mariano and Andres Velasco (1996). Where Are We in the Political Econ-
omy of Reforms?Journal of Policy Reforms, Vol. 1, pp. 187238.
[56] Windmeijer, Frank (2005). A Finite Sample Correction for the Variance of Linear
E¢ cient Two-Step GMM Estimators,Journal of Econometrics 126, 25-51.
[57] Wolfers, Justin (2007). Are Voters Rational? Evidence from Gubernatorial Elec-
tions,Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, mimeo.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Implicit di¤erentiation of (15) with respect to 2", 
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since marginal returns to reforms are assumed to be decreasing (f 00 (r) < 0).
Di¤erentiation of (16) with respect to 2", 
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 and , and using (17) yields:
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7.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Di¤erencing social welfare (20) w.r.t. 2" yields:
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This is positive if and only if the term in brackets is positive, i.e.,
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Di¤erencing social welfare (20) w.r.t. 2 yields:
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This is positive if and only if the term in brackets is positive, i.e.,
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7.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Recall:
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where we have substituted (37). Di¤erencing MC (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This expression is positive if and only if the term in brackets is positive, i.e.
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7.4 Proof of Proposition 4
From:
 =
 2f 00 (r)
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it is immediate to see that  is increasing in . To nd the e¤ect of uncertainty, note
that:
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under the condition in Lemma 1, which is assumed to be satised at . Thus, @=@2" =
@=@2 > 0:
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SD 0.946** 1.023** 0.930*** 0.929** 0.993*** 0.814**
[0.371] [0.455] [0.332] [0.384] [0.334] [0.332]
log(GDP_75) 0.453
[2.386]
DEFICIT -0.022 0.158
[0.163] [0.140]
#_CRISIS_DEF 0.022 0.084 0.091
[0.071] [0.098] [0.071]
#_left 0.139**
[0.063]
#_younggov -0.136
[0.063]
parliamentary -0.162
[0.694]
R-squared 0.148 0.150 0.149 0.153 0.216 0.489
Observations 20 20 20 20 20 20
Note. Dependent variable: # of Deficit Reform = number of years with
the annual change in DEFICIT (= government deficit as a share of
GDP) smaller than or equal to -1.17% over the sample period.
Regressors are: SD = standard deviation of the output gap over the
sample period; log(GDP_75) = log of real GDP per capita in 1975;
DEFICIT in period average; #_CRISIS_DEF= number of years with
DEFICIT less than or equal to -7.5; #_left = number of years with left-
wing governments; #_younggov = number of years with governments
in the first two years of office; parliamentary= dummy for
parliamentary (as opposed to presidential) systems. Regressions are
performed with ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are
reported in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10
per cent level.
OECD Countries, 1975-2000 - Cross Section
Table 1. Economic Volatility and the Number of Reforms
SD_1 0.290* 0.320** 0.346** 0.260*** 0.348*** 0.320**
[0.159] [0.163] [0.164] [0.070] [0.161] [0.164]
DEFICIT_1 0.153*** 0.114** 0.231*** 0.300* 0.317*** 0.321***
[0.047] [0.052] [0.058] [0.157] [0.076] [0.078]
OUTPUTGAP_1 0.093
[0.060]
log(GDP_1)  -4.288***  -3.934***  -3.925***
[1.471] [1.480] [1.510]
CRISIS_DEF_1 1.502** 1.502** 1.270*
[0.675] [0.675] [0.693]
election_1 -0.238
[0.334]
left_1 -0.330
[0.364]
younggov_1 -0.511
[0.372]
Observations 342 342 342 342 342 342
Countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Country-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2. Economic Volatility and the Likelihood of Reforms
OECD Countries, 1975-2000 - Panel
Note. Dependent variable is Deficit Reform = dummy taking value 1 if the annual
change in DEFICIT is less than or equal to -1.17%, zero otherwise. Covariates are
lagged values of: DEFICIT = government deficit as a share of GDP; SD = standard
deviation of the output gap over the previous five years; OUTPUTGAP; log(GDP) =
log of real GDP per capita; CRISIS_DEF= dummy taking value 1 if DEFICIT is less
than or equal to -7.5; election = dummy for legislative and/or executive elections; left
= dummy for left-wing governments; younggov = dummy for governments in the first
two years of office. Regressions are performed with panel logit with country fixed
effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at
1, 5 and 10 per cent level.
SD_1 -0.332**  -0.344**  -0.352**  -0.351**  -0.369***  -0.334**
[0.148] [0.152] [0.146] [0.148] [0.145] [0.149]
DEFICIT_1 0.843*** 0.852*** 0.775*** 0.725*** 0.682*** 0.687***
[0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047]
OUTPUTGAP_1 -0.024
[0.048]
log(GDP_1) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
[0.00005] [0.00005] [0.00005]
CRISIS_DEF_1  -1.317***  -1.151***  -1.099***
[0.434] [0.428] [0.431]
election_1 0.269
[0.263]
left_1 0.353
[0.286]
younggov_1 0.518*
[0.290]
R-squared 0.743 0.745 0.732 0.743 0.739 0.742
Observations 346 346 346 346 346 346
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20
Table 3. Economic Volatility and Reforms
Note. Dependent variable is DEFICIT = government deficit as a share of GDP.
Regressors are lagged values of: DEFICIT; SD = standard deviation of the output
gap over the previous five years; output gap; log(GDP) = log of real GDP per
capita; CRISIS_DEF = dummy taking value 1 if DEFICIT is less than or equal to -
7.5; election = dummy for legislative and/or executive elections; left = dummy for
left-wing governments; younggov = dummy for governments in the first two years
of office. Regressions are performed with least squares (LSDV) with country fixed
effects. Standard errors, in brackets, are corrected for heteroskedasticity and
consistency with Kiviet (1995) procedure. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5
and 10 per cent level.
OECD Countries, 1975-2000 - Panel LSDV
